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OPINION 
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____________ 
 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
A jury found petitioner Seifullah Abdul-Salaam, Jr. 
(“Abdul-Salaam”) guilty of first-degree murder, robbery, and 
conspiracy after a six-day trial in March 1995 in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.  After a 
one-day penalty phase hearing in which Abdul-Salaam’s 
counsel presented three mitigation witnesses, the jury 
sentenced Abdul-Salaam to death.  Abdul-Salaam, after 
exhausting his state remedies, filed the instant petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 
challenging his sentence based on trial counsel’s provision of 
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate 
adequately and to present sufficient mitigation evidence at 
sentencing.  The United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania denied the petition.  As explained 
more fully below, because trial counsel could not have had a 
strategic reason not to investigate Abdul-Salaam’s background 
school and juvenile records, to acquire a mental health 
evaluation, or to interview more family members about his 
childhood abuse and poverty, counsel’s performance was 
deficient.  Further, because there is a reasonable probability 
that the un-presented evidence would have caused at least one 
juror to vote for a sentence of life imprisonment instead of the 
death penalty, Abdul-Salaam has met the prejudice prong of 
the ineffective assistance of counsel inquiry.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse in part the Order of the District Court and remand 
to grant a provisional writ of habeas corpus directed to the 
penalty phase. 
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I. 
 
A. 
 
 At the guilt phase of Abdul-Salaam’s trial, the 
Commonwealth presented evidence showing that on the 
morning of August 19, 1994, Abdul-Salaam, with Scott 
Anderson, attempted to rob a store in New Cumberland, 
Pennsylvania.  Abdul-Salaam brandished a handgun during the 
robbery, then bound and assaulted the shop’s owner.  When 
Officer Willis Cole of the New Cumberland Police Department 
responded, Abdul-Salaam managed to escape but Anderson 
was caught.  As Officer Cole prepared to handcuff Anderson, 
Abdul-Salaam reappeared with his gun drawn, sprinted toward 
Officer Cole, and fired at him.  Officer Cole died of his gunshot 
wounds.  The jury returned a guilty verdict on first-degree 
murder, robbery, and conspiracy charges.   
 
 The penalty phase of the trial lasted one day.  The jury 
was instructed about four statutory aggravating factors that the 
Commonwealth had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.1  The 
first two factors were established by virtue of the guilt-phase 
                                              
1 The four aggravating factors were:  (1) “that the victim 
was a peace officer who was killed in the performance of his 
duty”; (2) that Abdul-Salaam “committed the killing while in 
the perpetration of a felony”; (3) that “in the commission of the 
offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death 
to another person in addition to the victim”; and (4) that Abdul-
Salaam had a “significant history of felony convictions 
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.”  
Appendix (“App.”) 238, 244. 
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testimony, and the Commonwealth presented eight witnesses 
to establish the last two factors.  
 
The defense presented three witnesses:  Abdul-
Salaam’s mother and two of his sisters.  Mahasin (“Dovetta”) 
Abdul-Salaam, Abdul-Salaam’s mother, testified that Abdul-
Salaam’s father, Seifullah Abdul-Salaam, Sr., was “very 
abusive” to him, but stated multiple times that “most of the 
abuse was mental,” such as by “inhibit[ing the children’s] 
worth and their consideration of themselves.”  Appendix 
(“App.”) 276–77.  Dovetta added that Abdul-Salaam, Sr. 
would also physically abuse the children and that to discipline 
Abdul-Salaam, the father — who abused drugs and was 
homeless at the time of trial — would punch him in the chest 
“pretty hard” “until he took the breath out of him.”  App. 283–
84, 286.  Dovetta added that as a child, Abdul-Salaam saw his 
father abuse her as well and often tried to protect her.   
 
Dovetta described the trouble that Abdul-Salaam 
experienced in school.  Because he could not pay attention as 
a result of his “deficit disorder,” Abdul-Salaam was placed in 
a special school.  App. 278.  In addition, when he was sixteen 
or seventeen, as a result of a juvenile adjudication, he was 
placed in an Alternative Rehabilitation Communities (“ARC”) 
program.  Dovetta insisted that she and her daughters love 
Abdul-Salaam and visit him in prison “every chance [they] 
get.”  App. 284.  
 
The next witness was Karima Abdul-Salaam, one of 
Abdul-Salaam’s younger sisters.  She “vaguely” remembered 
“spurts” of her father’s drug addiction and abuse.  App. 295–
96.  She said that their father verbally degraded all of the 
children and she recalled her father hitting Abdul-Salaam, 
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including one instance when she saw her father take an 
aluminum baseball bat into Abdul-Salaam’s room and then 
heard her father hitting him with it.  She recalled times as 
children when they could find no food in their house except for 
a can of beans.   
 
Safryah Abdul-Salaam, Abdul-Salaam’s youngest 
sister, briefly testified that she loved her brother and wanted to 
visit him as often as she could.  Although she was young at the 
time, Safryah remembered seeing her father throwing objects 
at their mother and hearing her father hitting Abdul-Salaam 
behind closed doors.   
 
At the close of the penalty phase, the trial court 
instructed the jurors that it was their task to weigh the 
aggravating factors against the mitigators and that they must 
issue a sentence of death if they found that the aggravating 
factors outweighed the mitigating factors.  However, each juror 
was instructed to give “whatever weight you deem reasonable 
to mitigating factors.”  App. 333.  The court added that a death 
sentence must be unanimous.  The jury found all four charged 
aggravating factors and one mitigating factor, namely that 
“[t]he background that includes both physical and mental 
abuse does have a negative impact on a person’s development 
and therefore his future behavior.”  App. 342; see also 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 9711(e)(8) (the “catchall” mitigating factor in 
Pennsylvania).  The jury unanimously found that the 
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factor and 
sentenced Abdul-Salaam to death.  
 
B. 
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 Abdul-Salaam filed a direct appeal to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court but did not raise an ineffectiveness claim.  That 
court affirmed the conviction and sentence, Commonwealth v. 
Abdul-Salaam, 678 A.2d 342, 355 (Pa. 1996), and the United 
States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Abdul-Salaam v. 
Pennsylvania, 520 U.S. 1157 (1997).  Abdul-Salaam then filed 
a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act 
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9541–46, in which he raised 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  The PCRA court 
held six days of hearings, during which Abdul-Salaam 
presented institutional records, witnesses who testified about 
Abdul-Salaam’s childhood, and mental health experts.  
 
1.  
 
 The most substantial corpus of new evidence consisted 
of Abdul-Salaam’s relatives’ testimony providing significantly 
greater detail on Abdul-Salaam’s difficult upbringing.  At the 
PCRA hearing, Abdul-Salaam called ten such witnesses, all 
but two of whom — his sister Karima and half-brother 
Raymond Harris — had not been contacted by trial counsel 
prior to sentencing.2 
 
Harris, Abdul-Salaam’s older half-brother by eight 
years, recalled his step-father as a “scary” figure from whom 
“anger . . . just came across.”  App. 384–85.  Harris described 
in detail the ways in which Abdul-Salaam, Sr. was abusive 
                                              
2 Harris said that Abdul-Salaam’s trial team first 
contacted him at 7 a.m. on the day of the penalty phase of the 
trial and asked him to come and testify at approximately 9 a.m. 
that day, but that he could not get to the trial on such short 
notice. 
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toward him, his mother, and Abdul-Salaam.  He testified that 
he and Abdul-Salaam repeatedly witnessed Abdul-Salaam, Sr. 
physically abusing their mother by punching her in the face or 
otherwise hitting her.  When Harris attempted to intervene, 
Abdul-Salaam, Sr. punched him in the stomach, knocking him 
to the floor.  Harris asserted that Abdul-Salaam, Sr. physically 
abused Abdul-Salaam on many occasions, including on several 
occasions by hitting Abdul-Salaam with a leather strap.  He 
described a pattern in which the father would abuse their 
mother, Abdul-Salaam would try to protect her, and the father 
would then punch him until he fell and would continue the 
assault “until [Abdul-Salaam] just broke down and cried and 
submit[ted].”  App. 389–90.  When asked how many times this 
occurred, Harris said he had “seen it happen pretty often.”  
App. 392.  He added that the family was regularly evicted and 
that there often was no food for the children to eat in the house.   
 
 Abey Abdul-Salaam, the petitioner’s younger brother, 
testified that as a child there were times when there was no food 
in the house and that he would sometimes eat lozenges from 
the bathroom for sustenance.  He remembered one time when 
he and Abdul-Salaam were playing basketball indoors and 
their father thought they were being too loud and so beat them 
both with an aluminum bat.  Josephine Hall, Abdul-Salaam’s 
maternal grandmother, testified that when she would see her 
grandchildren, they were hungry, withdrawn, and afraid of 
their father.  When she visited her daughter’s home there was 
almost no food in the house and she knew that the utilities were 
frequently turned off because the bills were not paid.  Eddie 
Washington, Jr., Abdul-Salaam’s first cousin on his mother’s 
side, recalled one occasion when Abdul-Salaam was seven or 
eight years old, where he and Abdul-Salaam were sitting in the 
backseat of a car while Abdul-Salaam, Sr. was driving.  The 
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children were talking and Abdul-Salaam, Sr. “snapped” at 
them “be quiet or I will kill you.”  App. 521.  Although he did 
not see Abdul-Salaam often, he recounted seeing him with a 
black eye on one of the numerous occasions when Dovetta 
brought the children over to Washington’s family’s house to 
get away from Abdul-Salaam, Sr.  Whenever Abdul-Salaam’s 
family would come over, he added, they were “very hungry” 
and that “all they wanted to do” was eat.  App. 524. 
 
Florita Goodman, Abdul-Salaam, Sr.’s sister, testified 
vividly about the abuse: 
 
[O]ne time I saw him take [Dovetta’s] money . . 
. .  And she was crying.  And she wanted her 
money back.  And he was taunting at her . . . and 
took the money and just ripped it up into shreds 
. . . and then threw it at her.  And she was like 
picking up the money off the floor, but she didn’t 
have any clothes on, and then . . . he beat her with 
a belt. 
 
App. 453.  She recalled seeing her brother force Abdul-Salaam 
to lick envelopes all night.   
 
Dana Goodman, Abdul-Salaam, Sr.’s younger brother, 
described Abdul-Salaam, Sr. as violent growing up and 
testified that as an adult his brother once tried to strangle him 
with an extension cord.  Dana also said that when Abdul-
Salaam was a child, Abdul-Salaam, Sr. gave all of the family’s 
money to the Nation of Islam, leaving no money for food or 
rent.  He said that when he saw the family together, Abdul-
Salaam, Sr. made Abdul-Salaam recite the rules of the Nation 
of Islam and would strike him if he made a mistake.  Dana saw 
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Abdul-Salaam, Sr. “beat up” Abdul-Salaam “between eight 
and twelve times,” including with a stick, baseball bat, and a 
pipe.  App.  721–23, 729.  Dana also stated that Abdul-Salaam, 
Sr. would punch Abdul-Salaam with his fist as punishment.  He 
added that more than once when the Abdul-Salaam was a small 
child, he saw Abdul-Salaam, Sr. hit Abdul-Salaam until he was 
lying on the floor and bleeding, but did not intervene out of 
fear that Abdul-Salaam, Sr. would turn on him.  Lawrence 
Goodman, Abdul-Salaam, Sr.’s other brother, also recounted 
fearing Abdul-Salaam, Sr. and seeing him smack Abdul-
Salaam with a spoon, causing him to develop lumps on his 
head.  He stated that Abdul-Salaam, Sr. forced the children to 
learn the Koran late at night.   
 
Karima testified that she remembered seeing her father 
physically abuse her brothers and had seen her father hit 
Abdul-Salaam more than ten times.  As she did at trial, Karima 
described the incident when she heard her father hit her 
brothers with a bat.  She said that her father used cocaine and 
marijuana and that her mother took her and her siblings to 
battered women shelters two or three times.  She also said that 
when she was a child, there were days they did not eat, that 
they were evicted several times, and that their utilities were 
often turned off.  Karima explained that before the penalty 
phase of the trial, Abdul-Salaam’s trial attorney spent a total of 
10 to 15 minutes talking to her.   
 
Abdul-Salaam, Sr. also testified.  He admitted to drug 
addiction, being verbally “very, very rough” with his children, 
and hitting Abdul-Salaam, but contended that he would only 
strike him when it “was called for,” meaning when Abdul-
Salaam did something “really drastic,” such as making fun of 
prayers.  App. 629–34, 638.  He agreed that he taught Abdul-
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Salaam “racial hatred” and that “white people were evil.”  App. 
640.  He denied, however, hitting Abdul-Salaam with a 
baseball bat.   
 
Finally, Abdul-Salaam’s trial counsel, Spero Lappas, 
testified.  Lappas testified that his mitigation strategy during 
the penalty phase of the trial was to present evidence of Abdul-
Salaam’s difficult upbringing.  Lappas stated that he had not 
identified any mental health issues at trial, although he had 
arranged to appoint a psychiatrist, Dr. Crutchley, to evaluate 
Abdul-Salaam.  Lappas did not recall conducting any further 
investigation into Abdul-Salaam’s mental health.  He noted 
that his associate, Ann Ariano, was responsible for 
interviewing family members and that she told him “that there 
would be evidence of pretty severe child abuse,” but he did not 
recall if he knew pre-trial about Abdul-Salaam’s learning 
disabilities.  App. 1301–02.  Lappas added that he did not try 
to obtain Abdul-Salaam’s school or juvenile records and that 
he could not identify a strategic reason for not doing so.  
 
Lappas explained his belief that presenting mental 
health evidence has a dangerous side to it, but agreed that there 
was no danger in investigating the matter in the first place and 
again could not say why he did not do so.  He articulated his 
view that battling mental health experts create “a very bad 
impression on a jury.”  App. 1314.  He added cryptically that 
mental health defenses raise a risk of relitigating the crime and 
allowing the prosecutor “to not just describe the defendant’s 
acts in a factual context, but in almost a moral context.”  App. 
1314.  Lappas testified that he refused to have Dr. Crutchley 
evaluate Abdul-Salaam because he did not want her to explore 
events relating to the underlying charges and because Dr. 
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Crutchley indicated that it was important to her that there 
would be expressions of remorse.   
 
Lappas’s associate, Ann Ariano, also testified.  She 
recalled interviewing Dovetta, Karima, and Abey in preparing 
for trial, but not any other family members.  She stated that all 
of the interviews were conducted shortly before the trial, but 
she could not remember exactly when.   
 
2.  
 
 Abdul-Salaam also introduced a large number of school 
and juvenile records at the PCRA hearings, and these records 
were reviewed by the experts who testified at the hearings.  His 
school records, which trial counsel had not pursued, showed 
that Abdul-Salaam attended the Green Tree School in 
Philadelphia for children with special needs from just prior to 
his seventh birthday to age twelve.  During his enrollment 
there, Abdul-Salaam underwent multiple psychological and 
neurological evaluations.  At age six, he was found by 
psychiatrist Katharine Goddard to be hyperactive, 
undisciplined, and paranoid and given a diagnosis of 
“Unsocialized Aggressive Reaction of Childhood Secondary to 
Phobic Reactions.”  App. 1626–27.  Goddard deemed his 
problems so severe that they could not be accommodated even 
in a class for emotionally disturbed children and recommended 
placement in a residential psychotherapeutic facility.  Other 
evaluations recommended placement in a class for emotionally 
disturbed children on an emergency basis because he was a 
physical threat in the classroom.  One neurological exam noted 
“some signs of minimal cerebral dysfunction,” while another 
assessment did not reveal such impairment but recommended 
a full neurological exam to reach a firm conclusion.  App. 
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1632–33.  The school records also contained evidence 
suggesting that Abdul-Salaam experienced physical abuse at 
home.   
 
 Abdul-Salaam’s juvenile records paint a similar picture 
of difficulty socializing, repeated adjudications of 
delinquency, psychological evaluations, brief improvements, 
and relapses.  The Commonwealth used many incidents from 
his criminal history to establish aggravating factors at 
sentencing, see App. 249, 254–57, 264–65, but trial counsel 
failed to obtain the related records.  They contained additional 
psychological evaluations, such as those taken in May 1986, 
after Abdul-Salaam was released from the Lehigh County 
Juvenile Detention Home and placed in the Wiley House 
Diagnostic Center.  Those evaluations diagnosed Abdul-
Salaam with an Adjustment Reaction with Mixed Disturbance 
of Emotions and Conduct which expressed itself in terms of 
conduct (stealing) and in terms of emotions (depression and 
anger related to his father and inadequate money).   
 
In June 1986, Abdul-Salaam was placed in the Glen 
Mills School for Boys.  Abdul-Salaam initially adjusted 
poorly.  Although his behavior began to improve, Dovetta 
asked for his release because she needed his help supporting 
the family.  With the support of his probation officer, who was 
under the belief that Abdul-Salaam, Sr. had permanently left 
the home, Abdul-Salaam was released in September 1986.  He 
was enrolled in his high school’s Socially-Emotionally 
Disturbed class but was quickly suspended for fighting.   
 
Abdul-Salaam found his way back into trouble.  In a 
report for the court, a juvenile probation officer noted Abdul-
Salaam’s history of “defiant and manipulative” behavior and 
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his “propensity to use violence as his major defense.”  App. 
2095.  The officer noted his unstable home environment and 
his conflict with his father due to his strict discipline and 
“conversion of the family to the Black Muslim religion.”  App. 
2095.  Abdul-Salaam was placed in the ARC Secure Facility 
in February 1987, when he was 16 years old.  His progress was 
initially slow, but his behavior and attitude improved and he 
was discharged in April 1988.   
 
3.  
 
 Abdul-Salaam and the Commonwealth presented 
medical experts at the PCRA hearing, who opined on Abdul-
Salaam’s mental health based on his records and their 
observations.  Abdul-Salaam presented the testimony of Drs. 
Patricia Fleming, Julie Kessel, Carol Armstrong, and Carolyn 
Crutchley.  The Commonwealth presented Holly Evans 
Schaffer and Drs. Paul Delfin and Larry Rotenberg. 
 
Dr. Fleming, a clinical psychologist who evaluated 
Abdul-Salaam, noted that his record and IQ scores were red 
flags warranting further neurological evaluation and that his 
academic deficits, including a third-grade reading level in the 
tenth grade, were significant.  She opined that his records 
showed the dynamics of an abused child.  Fleming believed 
that Abdul-Salaam was under the influence of extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance and had an impaired ability to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the 
offense.   
 
 Dr. Kessel, a psychiatrist, evaluated Abdul-Salaam and 
reviewed his records.  Kessel concluded that Abdul-Salaam 
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had attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), a 
cognitive disorder suggesting an organic impairment, and 
schizotypal features to his character.  Kessel disagreed with Dr. 
Rotenberg’s view that Abdul-Salaam was not brain damaged.  
She explained that his behavior was grossly abhorrent from a 
young age and he was diagnosed with minimal cerebral 
dysfunction (now known as ADHD).  Kessel found 
“substantial evidence” that Abdul-Salaam had been 
“victimized as a young person, preadolescent, and in his early 
youth” by his father’s emotional and physical abuse.  App. 
1070.  Kessel explained that a primary caregiver’s abuse 
impairs a person’s ability to make judgments as an adult and 
that as a person “with organic brain damage,” Abdul-Salaam 
would likely be less able to come to a socially appropriate 
resolution of the anger and aggression engendered by his 
father.  App. 1088–90.  Like Fleming, Kessel opined that in 
1994 Abdul-Salaam suffered from an extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance and that his capacity to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct and conform his conduct to the law 
was “[a]bsolutely” impaired.  App. 1093–94.  She believed that 
Abdul-Salaam had “substantial organic dysfunction” and that 
Dr. Rotenberg’s contrary diagnosis did not adequately explain 
Abdul-Salaam’s symptoms.  App. 1094–95. 
 
Dr. Armstrong, a neuropsychologist, tested Abdul-
Salaam and found severe impairments in his logical reasoning 
and cognitive flexibility.  She stated that the severity of Abdul-
Salam’s abuse was moderate, partly because it was “repetitive 
and chronic,” and described the damaging effects that such 
abuse can have on a child’s brain development.  App. 1216–
20.  She concluded that Abdul-Salam had “some sort of brain 
damage that’s preventing his frontal lobes from functioning 
well.”  App. 1177.   
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 Dr. Crutchley, the psychiatrist whom Lappas almost 
retained to evaluate Abdul-Salaam, also testified.  Crutchley 
said she had asked Lappas to obtain Abdul-Salaam’s school 
and juvenile records, but that she did not receive them.  She 
opined that Dr. Armstrong’s report “document[s] 
neuropsychological impairment,” which would interfere with 
Abdul-Salaam’s ability to control his behavior and noted that 
the disparity between Abdul-Salaam’s verbal and performance 
IQ raises questions concerning whether he had brain damage 
and called for further testing.  App. 1031–32.   
 
 In rebuttal, the Commonwealth presented Schaffer’s 
testimony that she administered two personality tests to Abdul-
Salaam, with Dr. Rotenberg present.  Dr. Delphin interpreted 
the tests (but did not assess Abdul-Salaam) as well as the 
conclusions of Drs. Fleming and Armstrong, and determined 
that based on their reports, Abdul-Salaam’s 
neuropsychological test results were within normal limits and 
that there was “[n]o evidence of neuropsychological 
problems.”  App. 1378–80, 1383–84, 1389.  Delphin 
challenged the results of Dr. Fleming’s personality tests and 
explained that despite Abdul-Salaam’s antisocial and sadistic 
personality, he was not at the time of the murder under the 
influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance or 
impaired in his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.  
He found no evidence of organic brain damage or a schizotypal 
disorder.  
 
 Dr. Rotenberg evaluated Abdul-Salaam and reviewed 
his school records, and opined that impulsive behavior and 
ADHD does not mean a person cannot conform their acts to 
the law.  He said that based on Abdul-Salaam’s experts’ 
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conclusions, one would have expected that he would have been 
hospitalized or treated with medication.3  Turning to Abdul-
Salaam’s juvenile record, he noted evidence of Abdul-
Salaam’s violent and manipulative behavior noted at the Wiley 
House, explaining that Abdul-Salaam’s description as being a 
strong leader and ridiculing others showed “sophisticated 
form[s] of interaction,” which implied that Abdul-Salaam had 
the intellectual ability to perceive right from wrong.  App. 
1468–71.  Rotenberg found the extent and nature of the abuse 
less clear than as described by others.  He diagnosed Abdul-
Salaam with a personality disorder, not otherwise specified, 
with antisocial, obsessive-compulsive and narcissistic features.  
Based on his evaluation, Abdul-Salaam’s records, and “all the 
testimony” and affidavits, Rotenberg determined that Abdul-
Salaam did not have organic brain damage or a schizotypal 
personality, that he was not under the influence of an extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime, and 
that his ability to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
the law was not substantially impaired.  App. 1494–96.   
 
C. 
 
 The PCRA court denied Abdul-Salaam post-conviction 
relief.  In its ruling on Abdul-Salaam’s ineffective assistance 
claim, the PCRA court determined that trial counsel did not 
render deficient representation in failing to investigate or 
present the above-noted mitigating evidence because he did so 
                                              
3 Abdul-Salaam argues reasonably that Rotenberg’s 
assessment here misconstrues the record, which includes 
numerous indications that Abdul-Salaam was, in fact, 
recommended for such interventions.  See Reply Br. 12–13; 
App. 1627. 
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for a reasonable strategic purpose.4  Based on Lappas’s 
testimony that mental health testimony resulted in a battle of 
experts that was unappealing to the jury and risked relitigating 
the crime, as well as his reason for not retaining Dr. Crutchley, 
the PCRA court reasoned that “a detailed revelation of the 
defendant’s past, necessary to mount any sort of mental health 
defense, posed the very real risk of doing more harm than 
good.”  App. 1580.  The PCRA court also noted that it found 
the assertion that Abdul-Salaam suffered from “organic brain 
damage or any other mental illness” to be “deeply flawed” and 
“completely unpersuasive.”  App. 1581, 1583.  The PCRA 
court made no findings regarding prejudice.  
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.  Like the 
PCRA court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached its 
decision primarily on the basis that Lappas’s performance was 
not deficient because, based on the concerns he stated at the 
PCRA hearing, he “had a reasonable basis for not presenting 
the mitigating evidence [Abdul-Salaam] now claims counsel 
should have offered.”  Commonwealth v. Abdul-Salaam, 808 
A.2d 558, 562 (Pa. 2001).  Although not expressly reaching the 
issue of prejudice, in a footnote, the Court noted that Abdul-
Salaam’s claim “that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
present evidence of the abuse he suffered as a child . . . is 
specious in light of the fact that . . .  counsel presented the 
testimony of several family members who described 
                                              
4 In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 
United States Supreme Court provided the standard for judging 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  To succeed, a 
petitioner must show (1) “that [his] counsel’s performance was 
deficient;” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense.”  Id. at 687. 
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Appellant’s abusive upbringing” and that calling additional 
family members would “have merely been cumulative.”  Id. at 
562 n.5.  In another footnote, the Court agreed with the PCRA 
court that the mental health evidence did not show that Abdul-
Salaam suffered from “organic brain damage or any other 
mental illness.”  Id. at 561 n.4. 
 
D. 
 
 Abdul-Salaam filed a petition in federal district court 
seeking a writ of habeas corpus.  As relevant on appeal, Abdul-
Salaam claimed that trial counsel was constitutionally 
ineffective during the penalty phase of his trial for failing to 
investigate and present testimony of (1) family members 
regarding his dysfunctional and violent childhood, (2) records 
relating to his schooling, prior criminal history, and childhood 
mental health evaluations, and (3) a mental health expert.  The 
District Court denied relief.  Reviewing the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s determination that trial counsel had a 
reasonable basis not to present mitigation evidence under the 
deferential standard of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), it found 
“no reasonable argument to sustain” this conclusion, because 
Lappas could not have — and admitted that he did not have — 
any basis not to investigate the institutional records from 
Abdul-Salaam’s childhood.  App. 151–53.  However, assessing 
Strickland’s prejudice prong — which it reviewed de novo 
given the absence of treatment at the state court level — the 
District Court concluded that Abdul-Salaam was not 
prejudiced by his counsel’s deficient performance.  The 
District Court reasoned that because the jury heard testimony 
about Abdul-Salaam’s childhood abuse, learning disorders, 
and behavioral problems, and in fact applied the “catchall” 
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mitigating factor in response to that evidence, it was not 
reasonably probable that further evidence about Abdul-
Salaam’s childhood abuse and mental health would have 
changed the outcome of his sentencing.   
 
Abdul-Salaam timely filed a notice of appeal, and this 
Court granted a Certificate of Appealability with respect to a 
single claim:  whether “trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance during the penalty phase by failing to investigate and 
present mitigating evidence.”  App. 189.  We now conclude 
that he did. 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
2241 and 2254.  This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.  Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 
127 (3d Cir. 2013).  Because the District Court did not hold an 
evidentiary hearing, our review of the District Court’s opinion 
and order is plenary.  Robinson v. Beard, 762 F.3d 316, 323 
(3d Cir. 2014).  However, to the extent the Commonwealth 
courts ruled on the merits of Abdul-Salaam’s ineffectiveness 
claim, we must apply AEDPA deference to the “last reasoned 
decision” of the Commonwealth courts on that claim.  Bond v. 
Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289–90 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
A. 
 
AEDPA “limits the power of a federal court to grant 
habeas relief to a person in custody pursuant to a state court 
judgment” to when the person’s custody is “in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”  Han Tak 
Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 402 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 
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U.S.C. § 2254(a)).  Where the Commonwealth court 
adjudicated the merits of a federal claim, a district court may 
grant habeas relief on that claim only if the Commonwealth 
court’s decision was (1) “contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2) 
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d).  If, however, the Commonwealth court did 
not address the merits of a federal claim, “‘the deferential 
standards provided by AEDPA . . . do not apply,’ and we ‘must 
conduct a de novo review over pure legal questions and mixed 
questions of law and fact, as a court would have done prior to 
the enactment of AEDPA.’”  Johnson, 705 F.3d at 127 (first 
quoting Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 429 (3d Cir. 2007); then 
quoting Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001)).  A 
state court decision is “an unreasonable application” of 
Supreme Court case law only “if the state court identifies the 
correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s 
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of 
the prisoner’s case.”  Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 
(2000).  “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit 
precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists 
could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s 
decision.”  Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) 
(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 
 
Both of the Commonwealth courts here denied Abdul-
Salaam’s ineffectiveness claim on the basis of the deficient 
performance prong and did not expressly reach the prejudice 
analysis.  See Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d at 562.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court accordingly wrote the last 
reasoned decision on the deficiency prong, so our deference 
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will focus on its analysis.  Bond, 539 F.3d at 289.  Although it 
was not the basis of its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court determined that Abdul-Salaam’s claim concerning 
counsel’s failure to investigate additional family members or 
present more evidence of his childhood abuse was “specious” 
and that calling additional family members would “have 
merely been cumulative.”  Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d at 562 n.5.  
Such a factual determination must be reviewed under the 
deferential § 2254(d)(2) framework.  See Lambert v. 
Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 235–36 & n.19 (3d Cir. 2004); 
Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 286 (3d Cir. 2001); see also 
Vega v. Ryan, 757 F.3d 960, 974 (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing, 
under § 2254(d)(2), a “state court’s findings that [a witness’s] 
testimony would have been cumulative and would have had no 
effect on the verdict”); Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 216 
(5th Cir. 2014) (same); Cooper v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 646 
F.3d 1328, 1353 (11th Cir. 2011) (same); Hall v. Washington, 
106 F.3d 742, 752 (7th Cir. 1997).5  In addition, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s agreement that the mental 
                                              
5 To the extent that this statement could be read as a 
merits determination that the omission of the additional family 
evidence did not prejudice Abdul-Salaam because it was 
merely cumulative, see Lewis v. Horn, 581 F.3d 92, 116 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (requiring the application of § 2254(d) deference 
where the state court’s “decision can be interpreted as 
concluding that [petitioner] was not prejudiced . . . just as easily 
as it can be interpreted as concluding that his counsel’s conduct 
was not unreasonable”), such a conclusion regarding the 
prejudice of a subset of evidence without considering the 
totality of the evidence is an unreasonable application of 
Supreme Court precedent and does not merit AEDPA 
deference, see Williams, 529 U.S. at 397–98. 
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health evidence did not show that Abdul-Salaam suffered from 
“organic brain damage or any other mental illness,” Abdul-
Salaam, 808 A.2d at 562 n.4, is a factual determination that 
binds this Court unless we conclude it was objectively 
unreasonable or unsupported by clear and convincing 
evidence, § 2254(d)(2), (e)(1).  These factual findings aside, 
because the Pennsylvania courts did not address the prejudice 
prong of the ineffectiveness inquiry, we review that legal 
question de novo.  See Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 
(2009) (applying AEDPA deference to state courts’ 
determination of the prejudice prong but de novo review to the 
deficiency prong, which the state court did not reach); 
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005) (applying de 
novo review to prejudice prong because state court reached 
only deficiency prong).6  
                                              
6 The Commonwealth argues based on Richter, 562 U.S. 
at 98, that we should apply AEDPA deference to the 
Pennsylvania courts’ denial of the entire Strickland claim, 
covering both prongs, regardless of which prong those courts 
relied upon.  However, in Dennis v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 
834 F.3d 263, 283–84 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), this Court 
clarified that Richter applies only where a state court was silent 
as to which prong of a multi-part test it based its decision upon.  
Where, as here, the state court specifies that it based its ruling 
on one prong of a test, we do not apply deference to 
hypothetical theories that could support a decision based on the 
other prong, which the state court explicitly did not reach.  See 
id.  In its Sur Reply brief, filed after the publication of Dennis, 
the Commonwealth seems to concede that Dennis clarifies that 
Richter does not apply to this case.  See Sur Reply Br. 4–5.  
Instead, the Commonwealth argues that the internal logic of 
Strickland mandates that a decision that counsel was not 
24 
 
                                              
deficient has embedded within it the conclusion that there was 
no prejudice, such that the determination of the former is also 
a determination of the latter.   Commw. Br. 40–41; Sur Reply 
Br. 2.  However, the Supreme Court in Rompilla clearly 
rejected that this logic underlies Strickland, because it 
considered de novo the prejudice prong despite the state court’s 
merits review of the deficiency prong.  545 U.S. at 390.  
Whatever effect the Commonwealth asserts Richter had on the 
application of AEDPA review to the Strickland prongs, it had 
no impact on the underlying logic of the prongs themselves, 
which Rompilla clearly understood as operating 
independently.  See also Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 954 
n.10 (2010) (“The one inquiry, deficient mitigation 
investigation, is distinct from the second, whether there was 
prejudice as a result.”) 
Indeed, the Commonwealth misunderstands the 
analysis underpinning the deficiency prong.  A reviewing court 
will not second guess a counsel’s contemporaneous reasonable 
and bona fide strategic decision, even though “in the harsh light 
of hindsight” it might be abundantly clear that the strategy was 
not only faulty, but damaging.  Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702 
(2002); Richter, 562 U.S. at 110 (“[A]n attorney may not be 
faulted for a reasonable miscalculation or lack of foresight or 
for failing to prepare for what appear to be remote 
possibilities.”).  Prejudice, on the other hand, is analyzed 
taking into account everything that the reviewing court knows 
given the benefits of hindsight, whether or not it was 
reasonably ignored by trial counsel.  See, e.g., Lockhart v. 
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993) (holding that the concerns 
underlying “the rule of contemporary assessment” do not apply 
to the prejudice prong); Meyers v. Gillis, 142 F.3d 664, 668 
(3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that the prejudice inquiry requires a 
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B. 
 
We have little difficulty concluding that the District 
Court correctly found that trial counsel’s representation was 
deficient and that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision 
to the contrary was an unreasonable application of clearly 
established law.   
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that 
Lappas did not perform deficiently in failing to obtain mental 
health experts because Lappas’s testimony about the dangers 
of presenting expert testimony during a capital sentencing trial 
provided a reasonable strategic basis for his decision not to 
pursue such experts.  Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d at 562.  
Additionally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court appeared to 
conclude that Lappas was not deficient for failing to investigate 
and call additional family witnesses to testify because such 
testimony would have been cumulative of the testimony 
presented at trial.  Id. at 562 n.5.  Both of these conclusions 
                                              
“court to determine in hindsight” whether counsel’s deficient 
performance affected the outcome).  It is entirely consistent 
with Strickland to find that counsel’s representation was not at 
the time deficient but to recognize that, had counsel pursued a 
different (and in hindsight clearly better) approach, there is a 
“reasonable probability” that “the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  In 
this way, counsel’s performance can, as a matter of logic, be 
not deficient but nonetheless have prejudiced his client.  Of 
course, because Strickland requires both deficiency and 
prejudice, such a circumstance would nevertheless fail to 
constitute a Sixth Amendment violation.  
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involved an objectively unreasonable application of the 
deficient performance prong of the Strickland test.   
 
Although “strategic choices made after thorough 
investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are 
virtually unchallengeable,” an unreasonably limited 
investigation informing those strategic choices can amount to 
deficient performance.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91.  That 
is because “if counsel has failed to conduct a reasonable 
investigation to prepare for sentencing, then he cannot possibly 
be said to have made a reasonable decision as to what to present 
at sentencing.”  Blystone v. Horn, 664 F.3d 397, 420 (3d Cir. 
2011).  Counsel can make a strategic decision to halt an avenue 
of investigation if he has completed a foundation of 
investigation to reach that decision, but decisions not to 
investigate certain types of evidence cannot be called 
“strategic” when counsel “fail[s] to seek rudimentary 
background information.”  Bond, 539 F.3d at 289.  This Court 
has highlighted that counsel often will need to obtain school, 
medical and other institutional records, which are “readily 
available,” to glean the background information necessary to 
direct the rest of an investigation.  Id. at 288; Blystone, 664 
F.3d at 420.  A failure to investigate background records can 
amount to deficient performance even where “not all of the 
additional evidence” in those records is favorable to the 
defendant, Williams, 529 U.S. at 396; Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 
945, 951 (2010), or where counsel had presented evidence that 
articulated the gist of the un-investigated evidence, Sears, 561 
U.S. at 954. 
 
Because Lappas failed sufficiently to pursue expert 
testimony about Abdul-Salaam’s mental health, his proffered 
explanation that such testimony might result in warring experts 
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or a relitigation of the trial was unreasonable, given that he had 
no basis to presume that the content of the unpursued expert 
reports would even provide fodder for disagreement.  See 
Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 307 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“A decision cannot be fairly characterized as 
‘strategic’ unless it is a conscious choice between two 
legitimate and rational alternatives.”).  But even if this decision 
could be considered strategic, Lappas’s asserted basis for not 
introducing such experts could not justify his failure to even 
obtain their views or to obtain Abdul-Salaam’s background 
educational and juvenile records for his own review.  Such 
information provides the kind of “rudimentary background 
information” that there can be no strategic reason not to 
investigate, whether or not the records are ultimately 
introduced at trial.  Bond, 539 F.3d at 289; Tennard v. Dretke, 
542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004) (“[I]mpaired intellectual functioning 
is inherently mitigating.”).  The reasonableness of counsel’s 
performance is determined based on the “prevailing 
professional norms” at the time of the representation, Bond, 
539 F.3d at 288, and “[i]t is unquestioned that under the 
prevailing professional norms at the time of [the] trial, counsel 
had an ‘obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the 
defendant’s background,’” Porter, 558 U.S. at 39 (quoting 
Williams, 529 U.S. at 396)).  Lappas plainly failed to do so 
and, regarding the school and juvenile records, admitted that 
this oversight had no strategic basis.   
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s conclusion that 
Lappas did not perform deficiently in failing to investigate and 
present more than three family witnesses about Abdul-
Salaam’s abusive upbringing was also unreasonable.  In the 
assessment of the deficiency prong in this case, the issue is not 
whether counsel should have introduced more family witnesses 
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in mitigation, but instead “whether the investigation . . . was 
itself reasonable.”  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 
(2003).  The ABA Guidelines applicable at the time of Abdul-
Salaam’s 1995 trial — which courts consider to “assess 
counsel’s performance,” Saranchak v. Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of 
Corr., 802 F.3d 579, 595 (3d Cir. 2015) — provided that in 
preparing for a capital sentencing trial, defense counsel should 
try to “discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence,” 
regardless of whether all of that evidence will ultimately be 
introduced at trial.  ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and 
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 11.4.1(C) 
(1989).  Lappas could not have had a strategic reason to limit 
his investigation to interviewing only three family witnesses, 
instead of interviewing more family members and then 
deciding which of them would present the strongest mitigation 
testimony at trial.  Based on Lappas’s and Ariano’s PCRA 
testimony, it seems that counsel contacted so few of Abdul-
Salaam’s family members due to a lack of preparation and not 
for any strategic reason.  Counsel’s representation was 
deficient.  
 
C. 
 
 Abdul-Salaam may establish prejudice by showing “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  “A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Id.  Because the Commonwealth courts did not 
reach the prejudice prong of the analysis, our review is de 
novo. 
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 The issue here is whether, but for trial counsel’s failure 
to adequately investigate mitigating evidence, there is a 
reasonable probability that the jury would have imposed life 
imprisonment instead of the death sentence.  Because a 
Pennsylvania death sentence must be unanimous, a defendant 
can show prejudice “if there is a reasonable probability that the 
presentation of the specific and disturbing evidence of 
childhood abuse and neglect as a mitigating factor would have 
convinced one juror to find the mitigating factor[] to outweigh” 
the aggravating factors.  Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 309.  Prejudice 
may exist even if the defendant could not have established 
additional mitigating factors if he can show that but for 
counsel’s errors he could have “presented evidence of an 
entirely different weight and quality” going to the same 
mitigating factor established at trial.  Id. at 310.  In other words, 
prejudice may exist where but for counsel’s errors, evidence 
could have been introduced “that was upgraded dramatically in 
quality and quantity,” Bond, 539 F.3d at 291, even where that 
evidence supports the same mitigating factor pursued at trial, 
see Saranchak, 802 F.3d at 600.  
 
To determine whether there is a reasonable probability 
that the uninvestigated mitigation evidence would have 
changed one juror’s mind, we must “evaluate the totality of the 
available mitigation evidence — both that adduced at trial, and 
the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding” and re-weigh 
that evidence against the evidence that the Commonwealth 
produced in aggravation.  Williams, 529 U.S. at 397–98.  
Although we perform this legal analysis de novo, we must 
afford AEDPA deference to factual findings by the 
Commonwealth courts regarding the weight of that evidence, 
so long as they are not unreasonable in light of the record.  See 
Blackwell, 387 F.3d at 235–36 & n.19; Lambert v. Blodgett, 
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393 F.3d 943, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] federal court 
reviewing a state court conclusion . . . must first separate the 
legal conclusions from the factual determinations that underlie 
it.  Fact-finding underlying the state court’s decision is 
accorded the full deference of §[] 2254(d)(2) . . . .”).  We 
therefore defer to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s fact-
finding that Abdul-Salaam did not suffer at the time of the 
crime from organic brain damage or any other mental illness 
warranting the application of either of the two mental health 
mitigators Abdul-Salaam pursues.7  As explained more fully 
below, however, because we conclude that the un-presented 
                                              
7 Such deference to the factual determination that 
Abdul-Salaam does not suffer from organic brain damage does 
not, however, require us to discount Abdul-Salaam’s mental 
health testimony entirely.  Although the Pennsylvania courts 
found unpersuasive the assertion that Abdul-Salaam suffered 
from organic brain damage, they made no findings concerning 
other aspects of the mental health evidence, which include 
substantial findings that — although perhaps insufficient to 
independently establish additional mitigators — suggest a 
variety of mental illnesses and abuse-related disorders that 
bolster Abdul-Salaam’s mitigation defense.  See Bond, 539 
F.3d at 290–91 (refusing to defer to state court’s determination 
that defendant’s un-presented mental health testimony was 
entirely refuted and could not support a finding of prejudice, 
where the Commonwealth’s expert failed to discuss all the 
findings); see also Porter, 558 U.S. at 42–43 (holding that 
where, as here, a jury may consider as mitigating “mental 
health evidence that does not rise to the level of establishing a 
statutory mitigat[or],” “it was not reasonable to discount 
entirely the effect that [rebutted expert] testimony might have 
had on the jury”). 
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family member testimony “was of a totally different quality” 
than the “meager evidence” that had been “presented on that 
issue” at trial, Jermyn, 266 F.3d at 286, we will not defer to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s apparent factual conclusion 
that additional family member testimony would have been 
cumulative, see Abdul-Salaam, 808 A.2d at 562 n.5.  For this 
same reason — the vastly upgraded quality of the un-presented 
evidence — we conclude that the District Court erred in ruling 
that because trial counsel presented general evidence of Abdul-
Salaam’s troubled background, Abdul-Salaam was not 
prejudiced by the failure to investigate or present the additional 
evidence established at the PCRA hearing.  See Sears, 561 U.S. 
at 954 (“We have never limited the prejudice inquiry under 
Strickland to cases in which there was only ‘little or no 
mitigation evidence’ presented. . . .  [W]e also have found 
deficiency and prejudice in other cases in which counsel 
presented what could be described as a superficially reasonable 
mitigation theory during the penalty phase.” (citation 
omitted)).   
 
Abdul-Salaam’s trial counsel presented three witnesses 
to support the mitigation case — covering just 28 pages of trial 
transcript — which generally showed that Abdul-Salaam grew 
up in an abusive home and detailed one instance of severe 
abuse, when he was hit with a baseball bat.  In contrast, the 
evidence elicited during the PCRA hearings gave a much more 
detailed image of the home in which Abdul-Salaam was raised 
and highlighted the regularity with which Abdul-Salaam faced 
severe mental and physical abuse.  Harris described Abdul-
Salaam, Sr. as a “scary” figure who punched their mother in 
the face in front of the children, App. 384–85, and frequently 
severely abused Abdul-Salaam with a belt or balled fist.  He 
also described a disturbing pattern in which Abdul-Salaam 
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would attempt to protect his mother and then would get 
punched by his father until he fell on the ground and eventually 
“just broke down.”  App. 390–92.  Dana Goodman similarly 
testified with more disturbing detail than any of the witnesses 
at trial.  For example, he said that more than once when 
petitioner was a small child, he saw Abdul-Salaam, Sr. hit 
petitioner until he was bruised and bleeding, and on multiple 
occasions saw Abdul-Salaam, Sr. hit petitioner with a blunt 
object.  Goodman stated that he was too afraid to offer help 
because he, too, feared Abdul-Salaam, Sr.  The other witnesses 
at the PCRA hearing similarly filled in the story with details of 
extreme violence that Abdul-Salaam suffered at his father’s 
hands as a child and the serious poverty he experienced, 
including regular evictions and severe instances of lack of food 
as well as electricity.  See, e.g., App. 453 (Florita witnessed 
Abdul-Salaam, Sr. taking money from Dovetta, taunting her, 
and then beating her while she was nude); App. 521 
(Washington, Jr. recalling when Abdul-Salaam, Sr. threatened 
to kill Abdul-Salaam if he was not quiet); App. 749 (Lawrence 
saw Abdul-Salaam, Sr. hit Abdul-Salaam over the head); App. 
395–96 (Harris recalling lack of food and evictions); App. 
462–63 (Abey testifying about the lack of food in their 
childhood home and about when their father beat Abdul-
Salaam with an aluminum bat for being noisy); App. 499 (Hall 
noting that there was rarely food in the house when she visited 
and that utilities were often turned off); App. 524 (Washington, 
Jr. recounting that Abdul-Salaam’s family were extremely 
hungry when they visited); App. 720 (Goodman describing 
how Abdul-Salaam, Sr. sent all the family’s money to the 
Nation of Islam). 
 
 This testimony was supported by the school and 
juvenile records that could have been presented to buttress the 
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family’s claims of the abusive nature of the family home and 
the problems this caused for Abdul-Salaam starting from his 
childhood.  See, e.g., App. 1626, 1631, 1634 (Green Tree 
School records discussing abuse Abdul-Salaam experienced at 
home); App. 1917 (Glen Mills School report opining that 
Abdul-Salaam's relationship with his father “appeared to be a 
major force in promoting [his] acting out and subsequent 
delinquent behavior”); App. 2095 (probation officer’s view 
that Abdul-Salaam’s problems were linked to his unstable 
home environment and his conflict with his father).  The 
records also showed that throughout his childhood, Abdul-
Salaam was described as suffering from various social and 
emotional issues, including what appeared to be significant 
anxiety and fearfulness, self-doubt, and learning disabilities, 
including ADHD.  His school records further indicated that 
much of his childhood aggression and disruptive behavior was 
linked to these social, emotional, and learning issues and to his 
father’s abuse.  See, e.g., App. 1601 (Green Tree School 
records from 1981); App. 1622 (psychological evaluation in 
1979 stating that Abdul-Salaam felt “‘dumb’ and ‘stupid’ and 
fe[lt] isolated from his peers because of his learning 
disability”).  The evidence could have shown that, when 
removed from this detrimental environment, Abdul-Salaam’s 
behavior began to improve, but that his progress was stymied 
by his premature removal from the programs and reunification 
with his father.  See, e.g., App. 1788 (diagnosis from Wiley 
House that Abdul-Salaam was “salvageable” if placed in a 
supportive setting away from his father); App. 1826–27, 1849–
50 (reflecting Abdul-Salaam’s progress at ARC); App. 1917–
18 (Abdul-Salaam adjusted well at Glen Mills, was released at 
Dovetta’s request based on erroneous belief that his father had 
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left home permanently).8  Additionally, the mental health 
experts Abdul-Salaam presented at the PCRA hearing were 
able to explain the school records in the context of a child 
raised in an abusive home and how that context could explain 
the development of his issues with impulsive decision making, 
anxiety, aggression, and anti-social behaviors.  See, e.g., App. 
873 (Dr. Fleming explaining how Abdul-Salaam’s records 
showed the dynamics of an abused child); App. 1088–90 (Dr. 
Kessel explaining that a caregiver’s abuse impairs a child’s 
ability to make judgments as an adult); App. 1216–20 (Dr. 
Armstrong describing the damaging effects that abuse can have 
on a child’s brain development).  None of these conclusions 
were squarely rebutted by the Commonwealth’s experts, let 
alone addressed by the Commonwealth courts.  
 
The evidence presented at the PCRA hearings — 
consisting of extensive and detailed testimony about the 
poverty and abuse that dominated Abdul-Salaam’s upbringing, 
buttressed by the school records and mental health experts 
contextualizing those records — presented a far stronger 
mitigation case than the minimal mitigation testimony 
presented at trial, which presented the severe physical abuse as 
an uncommon, instead of dominant, feature of Abdul-Salaam’s 
childhood.  If this additional evidence had been presented to 
the jury, it could have changed the picture of Abdul-Salaam’s 
childhood from one that was abusive and poor in a general 
sense, with one or two more severe instances occurring over 
his entire lifetime, to one that appears to have been dominated 
                                              
8 At the PCRA hearing, Lappas noted that in past 
mitigation cases he has found this sort of “institutional 
adjustment” evidence useful.  App. 1304. 
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by severe and pervasive violence at the hands of his father and 
poverty that often rose to the level of serious deprivation. 
 
We conclude that there is a reasonable probability that 
presenting the PCRA evidence at trial would have resulted in 
at least one juror according significantly greater weight to the 
catchall mitigating factor, thereby “convinc[ing] one juror to 
find the mitigating factors to outweigh” the aggravating 
factors.  Blystone, 664 F.3d at 427.  Consequently, Abdul-
Salaam was prejudiced by trial counsel’s errors because there 
is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s deficient 
performance in failing to adequately investigate — and 
ultimately present — this mitigation evidence, at least one 
juror would have voted against the death penalty and changed 
the outcome of the penalty proceedings.  Having established 
both Strickland prongs, Abdul-Salaam is entitled to habeas 
relief.  
 
III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse in part the 
Order of the District Court and remand to grant a provisional 
writ of habeas corpus directed to the penalty phase. 
 
